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THE UNBUCKLED SEAT BELT-
A PROTECTION FOR THE
NEGLIGENT DEFENDANT
The enactment of seat belt legislation on the state1 and federal2
level is a fairly recent development. It has produced new and com-
plex issues in many of the previously simple automobile accident
cases. With the enactment of this legislation, defense attorneys were
quick to realize the new issues presented. They sought to introduce
the failure to wear seat belts as a defense to plaintiff's cause of
action or in mitigation of the damages. This defense, if accepted,
would permit the negligent defendant to evade responsibility or to
reduce his liability for the injuries caused by the plaintiff's failure
to utilize an available seat belt.
A California District Court of Appeal, in the case of Truman
v. Vargas,' considered the question and gave recognition to the
seat belt defense. By this decision, California has recorded itE
willingness to admit evidence relevant to such a defense.
In contrast, decisions in other jurisdictions have held as a
matter of law that failure to wear an available seat belt does not
give rise to an inference of negligence and have refused to admit
evidence on that issue. Many decisions have also held that such
a policy determination should be left to the legislature.'
A small number of courts have allowed evidence of seat belt
use in considering plaintiff's duty of due care to provide for his
own safety.' However, most courts have held there is no common
I See Walker & Beck, Seat Belts and the Second Accident, 34 INs. COUNSEL J. 349
(1967).
2 See 32 Fed. Reg. 2408 (1967).
8 275 A.C.A. 1105, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1969).
4 Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. App. 1966). The trial court struck the
defense that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence for failing to make use of
an available seat belt. The district court of appeals held that the trial court did not
err in refusing to allow evidence of the plaintiff's failure to use his seat belt. Id. at
51. See also Robinson v. Humphreys, 56 Misc. 2d 211, 288 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1968);
Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. 1967). Contra, Sams v. Sams, 247
S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966).
5 Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. 1967). The court concluded
that the effectiveness of seat belts was still in doubt and left to the legislature the de-
termination of whether a person should be required to wear seat belts. Id. at 918. A
Florida court held that since no law required the use of seat belts "[I]t is not within
the province of this court to legislate on the subject, regardless of what might be the
thinking of the individual members of this court." Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49,
51 (Fla. App. 1966).
6 Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967). The court held
that there is a duty, based on common law standards of ordinary care, to use an
available seat belt. However, it was not error to refuse an instruction on that issue
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law duty to use an available seat belt 7 and that the reasonably pru-
dent person would not be expected to make use of such a device'
under normal driving conditions.9
Many courts have been unwilling to accept the seat belt de-
fense because of the inability to reasonably prove a causal relation-
ship between the injuries received and the failure to wear a seat
belt.10 The Truman court, recognizing this problem, required expert
testimony in situations that were beyond the general knowledge of
laymen." However, courts have still found most situations too
speculative. 2 Even expert testimony does not solve the problem. 3
where there was no evidence of a causal relationship between plaintiff's injuries andhis failure to wear a seat belt. A comparative negligence rule is applicable in thisjurisdiction. Id. at 639. See also Mount v. McClellan, 91 Ill. App. 2d 1, 234 N.E.2d
329 (1968).
7 Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969). The court
of appeals, after reviewing the seat belt cases in other jurisdictions, held that the
plaintiff was under no common law duty to wear an available seat belt and failure
to do so could not be deemed contributory negligence, nor would it be appropriate as
a damage mitigating factor. Id. at 610-11. Accord, Robinson v. Bone, 285 F. Supp.423 (D. Ore. 1968) ; Barry v. Coca Cola Co., 99 N.J. Super. 270, 239 A.2d 273 (1967).8 The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that "[D]ue care is measured by the
customary conduct of the reasonably prudent man. The scant use which the average
motorist makes of his seat belt, plus the fact that there is no standard for deciding
when it is negligent not to use an available seat belt, indicates that the court should
not impose a duty upon a motorist to use them routinely whenever he travels upon
the highway. If this is to be done, it should be done by the legislature." Miller v.
Miller, 273 N.C. 288, -, 160 S.E.2d 65, 73 (1968).
9 Robinson v. Lewis, 457 P.2d 483 (Ore. 1969) (no common law duty to wear
seat belts in ordinary vehicle travel) ; accord, Remington v. Arndt, 28 Conn. Supp. 289,
259 A.2d 145 (1969); Woods v. Smith, 296 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Fla. 1969).
10 See Turner v. Pfluger, 407 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1969). In an action to recover
for injuries sustained in a collision when plaintiff was thrown through the windshield,
the United States Court of Appeals, applying Oklahoma law, held that the defendant
had not established that plaintiff's injuries were due, in any part, to his failure tofasten his seat belt. Id. at 650. In a wrongful death action where deceased was not
wearing her seat belt and was thrown from the automobile, the court rejected the
view that the failure to use a seat belt was either negligence or a failure to minimize
damages. Jones v. Dague, 166 S.E.2d 99, 107 (S.C. 1969).
11 Truman v. Vargas, 275 A.C.A. 1105, 1111, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373, 376 (1969).
12 See North v. Scheurer, 285 F. Supp. 81, 85 (E.D. N.Y. 1968). The court held
that there is no duty upon an occupant of an automobile to wear an available seatbelt. It also stated that the question of whether utilization of seat belts might haveprevented decedent's death is a "highly speculative question which if considered, would
be a question for the jury, imposing a heavy burden of proof upon the defendant."Id. at 83. See also Jones v. Dague, 166 S.E.2d 99 (S.C. 1969); Bertsch v. Spears,
252 N.E.2d 194 (Ohio App. 1969).
13 See Kavanagh v. Butorac, 140 Ind. App. 139, 221 N.E.2d 824 (1966). Plaintiff
was injured when he struck the rear view mirror during an automobile accident.
Defendant produced expert testimony stating that plaintiff could not have hit the
mirror had'he been wearing his seat belt. On appeal the court held that contributory
negligence was not established by the mere evidence that the plaintiff did not fastenhis seat belt. Although expert testimony was produced, the court noted the speculative
nature of such a determination; only a few inches separated the plaintiff from the
mirror. Id. at 833,
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TRUMAN V. VARGAS
A. The Case
This was an action for personal injuries resulting from an
automobile collision. Plaintiff was riding as a passenger in the
front seat of an automobile which collided with a car driven by
defendant. The plaintiff was aware that the car was equipped with
seat belts, but at the time of the collision his seat belt was not
buckled. He brought an action for damages against the negligent
defendant. In answer, the defendant pleaded the contributory neg-
ligence of plaintiff in two particulars: First, that plaintiff diverted
the attention of the driver of his car, and second, that plaintiff's
failure to use his seat belt was a proximate cause of his injuries.
The trial judge instructed the jury that the consequences of the
failure to use a seat belt could be determined only by the testimony
of expert witnesses and since the defendant had not produced
any, this defense could not be considered. The verdict was for de-
fendant and the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial.
On appeal, the district court held that a new trial was properly
granted for the reason that plaintiff was not guilty of negligence
for diverting the driver's attention. 4 The court held, however, that
it was error to limit the issues upon retrial to the question of dam-
ages and that defendant's refusal to make use of expert testimony
in the first trial does not justify exclusion of such testimony in a
new trial.'5 The court formulated the test to be applied by the
trier of fact in determining whether plaintiff's conduct was negli-
gence, stating that:
[I]t was a question of fact whether in the exercise of ordinary care
Truman should have used the seat belt and that this question should
be answered from a consideration of all the circumstances in evidence
and any expert testimony as to the efficacy of seat belts, in so far as
the same was known, or in the exercise of ordinary care would have
been known to Truman.'
6
The court also adopted the trial court's reasoning that while plain-
tiff's failure to wear seat belts may have amounted to negligent con-
duct, such conduct is immaterial unless it was the proximate or
aggravating cause of the injury.'7 To establish plaintiff's negligence
14 Truman v. Vargas, 275 A.C.A. 1105, 1109, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373, 375 (1969).
15 Id. at 1112, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
16 Id. at 1111, 80 'Cal. Rptr. at 377.
'7 Id. at 1109, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
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as the proximate or aggravating cause, the court required expert
testimony because the evidence was beyond the general knowledge
of laymen.' s
The Truman decision creates new law in California. But it is
in direct conflict with the current decisions in other jurisdictions
which hold that no common law duty exists requiring the use of
seat belts. 9 One can only speculate as to why the Truman court
took this position. The only authority cited in Truman is Morten-
sen v. Southern Pacific Co.,2 0 and it was cited only to support the
necessity of expert testimony. A closer look at the Mortensen case
shows that it was an action under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act to recover for the death of an employee of defendant railroad
company. The deceased was killed when thrown from defendant's
truck which was not equipped with seat belts. The district court
of appeal held that it was a question for a jury to decide whether
the defendant's failure to provide seat belts amounted to negli-
gence.2'
Mortensen is not direct precedent for Truman since the former
was governed by the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which re-
quires that an employer provide safe working conditions for its
employees. While the Truman court may have taken notice of the
testimony in that case concerning the effectiveness of seat belts, 2
Mortensen was certainly not controlling on whether an occupant
of a vehicle is negligent in failing to use an available seat belt.
With this lack of authority to support the Truman decision,
one can only look to other considerations the court may have had.
Perhaps the court felt that this decision would provide an incen-
tive, in the form of a penalty, to encourage motorists to use their
seat belts. The court may also have thought it would be unfair
to require the defendant, even though negligent, to pay for injuries
that plaintiff may have prevented by using his seat belt.
Whatever the reasons or considerations for the Truman deci-
sion, it certainly will have an effect on most motorists in California
and will present many new and complex problems in the litigation
of automobile accidents.
18 Id.
19 See Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969); Robin-
son v. Lewis, 457 P.2d 483 (Ore. 1969); Remington v. Arndt, 28 Conn. Supp. 289,
259 A.2d 145 (1969); Woods v. Smith, 296 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Fla. 1969).
20 245 Cal. App. 2d 241, 53 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1966).
21 Id. at 244, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
22 Id.
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B. Effects
On its face, the first and paramount effect of Truman is that
now occupants can be held negligent for failing to "buckle-up." In
so holding, the court has set a new standard to which one must
conform for his own safety. If plaintiff fails to meet the standard,
in certain situations, he may be denied any recovery. In others,
there may be a diminution of damages. A policy that allows a neg-
ligent defendant to abscond with impunity is certainly not new in
our law but is one which contradicts current California policy for
providing compensation to accident victims through an expansion
of liability and a limitation of traditional defenses.2s
Truman may also prove to be a deterrent to the expanded
installation of seat belts. There is still a large number of car owners
who do not have seat belts installed in their automobiles.24 They
may now feel that whatever value seat belts may have, it is out-
weighed by the risk of being denied recovery for their damages
if seat belts were available, but not buckled, at the time of an acci-
dent. Why should a person accept the burden of being held to a
higher standard of conduct by having seat belts installed in his
automobile? On the one hand, plaintiffs run the risk of being denied
full recovery by their mere failure to buckle their belt, while on
the other hand, they would be permitted full recovery for damages
if their vehicle were not equipped with seat belts.2 5 Seat belts may
prove to be more of a liability than an asset. Inasmuch as a large
part of the motoring public frequently fails to use available seat
belts,26 seat belts may supply greater protection to the negligent
driver than to the innocent victim.
PROBLEMS
A. Determining Negligence
Ordinary care is defined as the care a reasonably prudent per-
son would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.
2 1 If
23 See Hayton, Present and Prospective Changes in California Automobile
Negligence Law, 2 CAL. WEST. L. REv. 201 (1969).
24 " 'Seat belts are now available to more than half of all passenger car occupants,
but the belts are being used less than half the time, on the average. As a consequence,
the net usage figure-the per cent of all exposure hours during which passenger car
occupants are using belts-is estimated to be only 20 to 25 per cent.' National Safety
Council, Accident Facts 53 (1967)." Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 288, -, 160 S.E.2d 65,
69 (1968).
25 "It would be a strange common law rule which would bar recovery to a
guest riding in a post-October belt equipped vehicle, while, on the same state of facts,
permitting recovery to a guest riding in a pre-November vehicle, i.e. one not equipped
with seat belts." Robinson v. Bone, 285 F. Supp. 423, 424 (D. Ore. 1968).
26 See note 24 supra.
27 Rangel v. Badolayo, 133 Cal. App. 2d 254, 259, 284 P.2d 138, 142 (1955).
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one's conduct falls below this standard, he is usually considered
negligent or contributorily negligent." The question is whether the
wearing of an available seat belt is the standard of, conduct to
which an occupant of an automobile must conform. The standard
of conduct may be established by a consideration of three sources:
Legislative standards, judicial standards, and the reasonable man
standard. 9
Legislative standards can provide the first source from which
a standard of conduct may be established. There are at least thirty-
two states which presently require the installation of seat belts.3"
Federal legislation also requires seat belt installation."' It is sig-
nificant to note that no state or federal statute requires the use
of seat belts for ordinary vehicle travel. There are two states that
have statutory requirements for the use of seat belts in certain
vehicles. 2 On the other hand, five states provide either that evidence
of failure to use a seat belt is inadmissible or that failure to use a
seat belt is not to be considered contributory negligence, nor is
such failure to be considered in mitigation of damages."
California, in particular, has enacted extensive seat belt legis-
lation. 4 The California Legislature amended previous code sections
in 1967 to make it illegal for a dealer to sell or offer for sale any
used passenger vehicle manufactured on or after January 1, 1962,
unless it is equipped with at least two seat belts which are installed
in the front seat of the vehicle.'" A dealer is subject to further
sanction if he sells or offers for sale any used passenger vehicle
manufactured on or after January 1, 1968, unless it is equipped
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965): "Contributory negligence is
conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he should
conform for his own protection, and which is a legally contributing cause co-operating
with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about plaintiff's harm."
29 Id. § 475.
30 Walker & Beck, Seat Belts and the Second Accident, 34 INs. COuNSEL J. 349
(1967).
31 32 Fed. Reg. at 2415, Standard No. 208, § 3.1 (1967).
32 CAL. VE11. CODE § 27304 (West Supp. 1970) (requires both drivers and pas-
sengers in driver-training vehicles to wear seat belts). R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-23-40(1969) (requires the drivers of buses and emergency vehicles to wear seat belts).
33 IOWA 'CODE ANN. § 321.445 (1966); ME. REv. STATS. ANN. tit. 29, § 1368-A(Supp. 1970); MINN. STATS. ANNr. § 169.685(4) (Supp. 1970); TENN. CODE ANm. tit.
59, § 930 (1968) ; CODE OF VA. tit. 46.1, § 309.1(b) (Supp. 1968).
34 In California it became unlawful after January 1, 1962, to sell a new passenger
vehicle which was not equipped with seat belt anchorage for two passengers in the
front seat. Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 1710, § 1 (repealed 1968). After January 1, 1964, no
new passenger vehicle could be sold which was not equipped with at least two safety
belts or safety harness combinations for at least two passengers in the front seat. Cal.
Stats. 1963, ch. 997, § 1 (repealed 1968).
35 CAL. VEr. CODE § 27314(a) (West Supp. 1970).
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with seat belts for each seating position .3  Along with this a com-
prehensive traffic safety program was established. 7
Inasmuch as the question of automobile safety is comprehen-
sively considered in California by statutory law, if the legislature
had intended that the use of seat belts should be required, it would
have so stated. The California Legislature, by requiring the use of
seat belts in certain vehicles,3" has shown that it is willing to act
when the social utility of such a requirement is appropriate. As
was stated in Pacific Coast Joint Stock Land Bank v. Roberts,39
"[I]t is the function of the courts to construe and apply the law
as it is enacted and not to add thereto or detract therefrom. 4 °
The creation of a seat belt defense would, in effect, amount to judi-
cial legislation.
Judicial standards provide the second source from which a
standard of conduct may be established. The courts that have con-
sidered the question have all held that this determination should
be made by the legislature.4' The court in Robinson v. Lewis,4"
stated that "[T]he task of investigating and testing the utility of
safety devices and determining when their use should be made
mandatory can best be performed by the legislature.1 43 In light
of this authority, the soundness of the Truman decision could be
challenged.
The third source by which a standard of conduct may be
established is through reference to the reasonably prudent man.
The question is whether the reasonably prudent man, considering
the probability of being involved in an automobile accident, would
make use of an available seat belt for his own protection. According
36 Id. § 27314(b).
37 CAL. VEH. CODE § 2900 (West Supp. 1970).
38 'CAL. VEI. CODE § 27304 (West Supp. 1970) requires both drivers and pas-
sengers in driver-training vehicles to wear seat belts.
39 16 Cal. 2d 800, 108 P.2d 439 (1940).
40 Id. at 805, 108 P.2d at 442.
41 "[I]t is for the legislature, which in its wisdom has prescribed seat belts, to
prescribe any required use thereof if it chooses." Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App.
119, -, 167 N.W.2d 606, 611 (1969); accord, Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla.
App. 1966); Dillon v. Humphreys, 56 Misc. 2d 211, 288 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1968); Miller
v. Miller, 273 N.C. 288, 160 S.E.2d 69 (1968); Robinson v. Lewis, 457 P.2d 483
(Ore. 1969). See also Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 916 (Del. Super. 1967),
where the court stated that it had in the past acted when confronted with persistent
failure of the legislative action, but such cases usually involved broad concepts of
personal liberty and the Constitution.
42 457 P.2d 483 (Ore. 1969).
43 Id. at 485. The court further stated: "We prefer at this time to leave this
problem to the legislature which can hold hearings, consider expert opinion, analyze
empirical data and exercise an informed legislative judgment." Id.
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to the Truman decision, this standard must be considered in the
light of the circumstances in evidence.44
A major problem is presented for the trier of fact in deter-
mining what the reasonable man would do under the particular
circumstances of each case. A jury would have to be careful, for
in some accidents an after-the-fact appraisal could reveal that one's
injuries might have been minimized had he been wearing a seat
belt. But whether a motorist was negligent in failing to buckle his
seat belt must be determined in view of his knowledge of condi-
tions prior to the accident and not in the light of hindsight.45 Since
one will not have time to fasteA his seat belt when the danger of an
accident becomes apparent, the duty to "buckle-up," if any, must
exist before a motorist begins his journey.46 However, since condi-
tions preceding any given trip will vary, so will conduct constituting
due care.
There are no objective standards for a jury to use in deter-
mining that the use of seat belts is required for one trip and not
for another.47 It would be extremely difficult to analyze the variables
presented in failing to use a seat belt before embarking on a normal
everyday drive.48 Such factors as the prevailing weather conditions,
the time of day, the types of roads, the distance to be traveled, the
size of the automobile, the person who is driving, the terrain, the
traffic congestion, the frequency of collisions in a particular area,
and the knowledge of any mechanical problems are some of the
variables that would have to be considered in making a determina-
tion whether one was under a duty to wear a seat belt on a partic-
ular occasion.
In addition, the Truman decision would also require the jury
to consider the effectiveness of seat belts in reducing injuries under
these varying conditions.49 It would seem a difficult task for a
motorist to consider even a few of these factors before beginning
his journey. It would probably be impossible for him to validly
analyze even a small portion of these variables before venturing
44 275 A.C.A. at 1111, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
45 Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 288, -,160 S.E.2d 65, 70 (1968).
46 Id.
47 "Without a meaningful standard for judgment, the triers of fact cannot find
the failure to fasten a seat belt to be negligence." Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 288, -,
160 S.E.2d 65, 71 (1968).
48 "To ask the jury to do so is to invite verdicts on prejudice and sympathy
contrary to the law. It is an open invitation to unnecessary conflicts in result and
tends to degrade the law by reducing it to a game of chance." Lipscomb v. Diamiani,
226 A.2d 914, 917 (Del. Super. 1967).
49 Truman v. Vargas, 275 A.C.A. 1105, 1111, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373, 377 (1969).
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onto the highway or driving to the neighborhood store. For one
thing, a motorist may not know what conditions he will encounter
during his drive. The longer one's trip the more likely it is that a
motorist will come upon a variety of driving conditions or that
conditions will quickly change. An even greater problem is posed
for the jury in determining what the reasonably prudent man would
do under similar circumstances. The large number of variables plus
the many unknown or changing conditions make such a determina-
tion speculative at best.50
Possibly the question of the use of seat belts is best resolved
by a fixed standard. "An occupant of a car involved in normal
everyday driving should either be required to wear a belt or he
should not.""' The Truman decision, nevertheless, leaves such a
determination to the trier of fact. Therefore, consideration will be
given to whether the reasonable man, considering the probability
of being involved in an automobile accident, would normally make
use of an available seat belt.
The utilization of seat belts and the general acceptance of their
effectiveness are indications of what the reasonable man would do.52
Since the majority of motorists fail to use available seat belts, 53
the argument can be made that such a failure is not a breach of the
duty of ordinary care based upon conduct of the reasonably prudent
man.54 Although public apathy toward the use of seat belts is cer-
tainly not controlling,5 the social utility of wearing a seat belt must
be established in the mind of the public before failure to use a seat
belt can be held to be negligence.5" "Otherwise the court would be
imposing a standard of conduct rather than applying a standard
accepted by society."57
Actually the probability of being involved in an automobile
accident is relatively low. In spite of the well-known hazards of
highway travel, most motorists arrive safely at their destination. 8
50 Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 288, -, 160 S.E.2d 65, 70 (1968).
51 Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 917 (Del. Super. 1967) (determination
should be left to the legislature).
52 Kavanagh v. Butorac, 140 Ind. App. 139, -, 221 N.E.2d 824, 832 (1966).
53 See note 24 supra.
54 Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 1428, 1430 (1967).
55 See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 33, at 168 (3d ed. 1964).
56 "The issue of the social utility of the use of seat belts is definitely not clarified
in the minds of the public and the courts. Doubts remain as to whether seat belts
cause injury, and the real usefulness of the seat belt in preventing injuries has not
become public knowledge." Note, Seat Belt Negligence in Automobile Accidents, 1967
Wis. L. REv. 288, 296.
57 Id. at 297.
58 Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, -, 230 A.2d 629, 635 (1967). In 1966
there were 4.6 deaths in Maryland caused by automobile accidents for every 100
[Vol. 10
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It is questionable whether the probability of suffering injury from
an automobile accident on any given trip is great enough to cause
a reasonably prudent man to wear a seat belt.
Even though accidents do occur, a motorist, in the absence
of conduct to put him on notice to the contrary, has a right to
assume others using the highways will perform their duty under
the law.59 He has a right to act upon this assumption and it is not
negligence to fail to anticipate injury or to take precautions to
avoid injuries that can occur .only from violation of the law or as
a result of another's negligence." This proposition is so basic that
it has been adopted in California as a uniform jury instruction. 61
Absent special circumstances known to a motorist, which
create hazards over and above the ordinary risks incident to high-
way travel, there is no common law duty to anticipate an accident
or to take precautions against such a possibility.2 If there is no
duty to anticipate such an accident, it would be difficult to hold
that a plaintiff failed to use ordinary care in not wearing his seat
belt.
The Truman decision would now require the triers of fact, in
the light of the foregoing, to take into consideration the efficacy of
seat belts, insofar as this was known or should have been known
to the plaintiff.63
While the use of seat belts does provide a certain safety factor,
there is some evidence that wearing a seat belt may cause more,
rather than less, injuries in certain situations.64 One obvious exam-
ple is that a driver, who is secured to his seat, will more surely be
million miles of highway travel. Id. "One would have to drive over 17,000,000 miles
to be sure of dying in a traffic accident." Campbell, Seat Belt "Defense" Sustained,
4 TRIAL, Je-JI, 1968, at 57.
59 See Hooker v. Oclaray, 191 Cal. App. 2d 94, 98, 12 Cal. Rptr. 308, 310 (1961);
Weeks v. Raper, 139 Cal. App. 2d 737, 294 P.2d 178 (1956) ; Chapman v. Mason, 83
Cal. App. 2d 685, 189 P.2d 510 (1948).
60 See Bechtold v. Bishop & Co., 16 Cal. 2d 285, 105 P.2d 984 (1940) ; Kaver v.
Holzmark, 185 Cal. App. 2d 138, 145, 8 Cal. Rptr. 145, 148 (1960); Atlas Assur. Co.
v. California, 102 Cal. App. 2d 789, 229 P.2d 13 (1951).
61 1 CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Civil No. 138 (1956).
62 See Remington v. Arndt, 28 Conn. Supp. 289, 259 A.2d 145 (1969).
6. Truman v. Vargas, 275 A:C.A. 1105, 1111, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373, 377 (1969).
64 "A multitude of injuries are caused by the lap belt. 1) The small bowels are
injured by direct violence and/or entrapment with subsequent perforation; 2) Burst-
ing injuries to the colon; 3) Injuries to the duodenum and pancreas; 4) Splenic
injuries; 5) Rupture gavid uterus; 6) Bladder rupture; and 7) Herniation-various
types, the most common of which is hiatus hernia.
"Even the shoulder belt can and does cause injuries to the hepatic veins, kidneys,
renal artery, spleen and liver." Beloud, The Changing Seat Belt Laws, 4 TRIAL, Je-Jl,
1968, at 60. See also National Dairy Products Corp. v. Durham, 115 Ga. 420, 154
S.E.2d 752 (1967) (injury from seat belt caused death).
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hit by a steering shaft in a severe collision. 5 Also, a person secured
to his seat may be in a more dangerous situation if involved in a
side collision.
Although some studies may indicate otherwise, there is a strong
belief and fear that seat belts increase the hazard in many acci-
dents.66 Additionally, fear of entrapment is a strong trait in human
character and is a leading cause for their nonacceptance.6 7 With
expert opinion divided and public acceptance still questionable, it
would seem unwise to hold a person, negligent or in breach of his
duty to exercise due care for failing to wear his seat belt."6
B. Causation
Even if it were determined that plaintiff did not conform to
the standards of a reasonably prudent man in failing to wear his
seat belt, the element of causation must still be established. A
difficult problem is encountered in proving a causal relationship
between the failure to wear seat belts and the injuries sustained.
Not every negligent act of the plaintiff immunizes the defen-
dant from liability. The doctrine of contributory negligence usually
requires that the plaintiff's conduct contribute to his injuries as a
proximate cause, as opposed to a remote cause or a mere condition.69
The Truman decision made a distinction between the failure to use
seat belts as a cause of the accident and as a cause of the injuries. 0
The court determined that the failure to wear seat belts could be
the proximate cause of the injuries without being the proximate
cause of the accident. 7 '
The problem is proving the causal relation between plaintiff's
conduct and the harm resulting to him. Many factors come into
65 Campbell, Seat Belt "Defense" Sustained, 4 TRIAL, Je-JI, 1968, at 57.
66 Robinson v. Lewis, 457 P.2d 483, 484 (Ore. 1969).
67 16 AM. Jua. PROOF or FACTS, Seat Belt Accidents § 3 (1965).
68 "In the comprehensive study conducted by Motor Vehicle Research, Inc.,
hundreds of controlled crashes at various speeds with dummies simulating the human
body placed in various positions with and without seat belts were observed by specially
located cameras, and it was concluded that standard waist type belts can cause more,
rather than less, injuries in many crash conditions. Therefore, whether or not the use
of waist type seat belts is desirable remains at best speculative." Kleist, The Seat Belt
Defense-An Exercise in Sophistry, 18 HASTIOS L.J. 613, 614 (1967). "It would be
absurd to deem the ordinarily prudent man negligent for failing to exercise proper
care for his own safety by not using the belt when experts, far more familiar with
the problem than he, cannot agree as to the belt's worth." Note, 42 ST. JoHN'S L.
REV. 371, 389 (1968).
69 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965).
70 275 A.C.A. at 1109, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
71 Id. at 1109, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
[Vol. 10
COMMENTS
play when an attempt is made to determine what would have hap-
pened to the plaintiff if he had been wearing his seat belt. In any
analysis, consideration must be given to at least the following fac-
tors: Speed of the vehicles on impact; size of the vehicles; collap-
sible characteristics of the vehicles; human body variations, includ-
ing height, weight and age of the plaintiff; position of plaintiff in
the vehicle, including any defensive movement taken before the
collision; proximity of fixed objects within the vehicle; and type
of accident or angle of impact.
The Truman court recognized the difficulty involved in an
analysis of this type and held that expert testimony would be
required unless such a determination was within the general knowl-
edge of laymen.72 In most situations, such a determination would
be beyond the comprehension of the layman. This would mean, al-
most without exception, that in every accident case involving the
issue of seat belt use, expert witnesses would have to be obtained.
As the Truman court pointed out, even expert opinion may not
be in agreement.7" When a jury is confronted with conflicting testi-
mony, on issues beyond their general knowledge, there seems to
be a critical area of speculation remaining. Even the expert qualifies
his testimony on the basis that the seat belt was "properly ad-
justed."74 It would be safe to say that there are many interpretations
of what would be considered "properly adjusted." Is the plaintiff
to be held negligent if he is wearing a seat belt at the time of the
accident but it was not "properly adjusted"?
This problem is not completely unique. The trier of fact deals
with similar issues when considering other proximate cause ques-
tions.15 However, in such cases the judgment deals with what did in
fact happen or what is reasonably likely to happen. Here a reason-
able judgment as to what would have happened cannot be applied.
There are so many variables involved that even expert opinion can-
not determine, in a given situation, what would have happened.
Even if we accept the proposition that seat belts generally do pro-
vide an added safety factor, this does not supply the trier of fact
with a causal relationship upon which to base its judgment. The
proof of causation cannot rest on guess or speculation.76
Id. at 1111, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
73 Id. at 1112, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
74 Kavanagh v. Butorac, 140 Ind. App. 139, 221 N.E.2d 824; 833 (1966).
75 Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 918 (Del. Super. 1967).
76 See Barry v. 'Coca Cola Co., 99 N.J. Super. 270, 239 A.2d 273 (1967) ; Lips-
comb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. 1967).
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C. Damages
In California, where the doctrine of comparative negligence
is not applied, contributory negligence is a bar to all recovery.
77
This is so even though the plaintiff's negligence contributed to only
a small part of his injuries. Such a rule would deny recovery to
the plaintiff whose mere failure to wear his seat belt in no way
contributed to the accident.
However, the Truman court recognized the fact that plaintiff's
failure to wear his seat belt had no effect on causing the accident.78
Therefore, plaintiff would still have a cause of action against de-
fendant but may be denied recovery for those injuries which could
have been avoided had a seat belt been used.
Although the Truman court did not label the theory behind
such a rule, it would seem to be applying the doctrine of avoidable
consequences. However, an analysis of the avoidable consequence
doctrine shows that such an application to the seat belt situation
is not proper.
The doctrine of avoidable consequences is frequently expressed
in terms of a duty, but it is more accurate to say that the wrongdoer
is not required to compensate the injured party for damages which
were avoidable by reasonable effort.79 Such a doctrine is distin-
guished from contributory negligence in that the two occur at differ-
ent times. Contributory negligence occurs either before or at the
time of the wrongful act of the defendant.8 On the other hand, the
rule of avoidable consequences comes into play after the wrongful
act of the defendant, but while some damage may still be averted,
and bars recovery only for such damages.8
The seat belt defense does not fit this rule since plaintiff's fail-
ure to buckle his seat belt occurs before defendant's negligent act
and before any injuries have occurred. Even if such a doctrine could
be applied, it may also produce undesirable results. If it is found
that the plaintiff's failure to use his seat belt did aggravate the in-
juries, but the injuries caused by the defendant and those caused
by the plaintiff cannot be reasonably separated, the plaintiff's neg-
ligence will bar all recovery. 2 This overly harsh result occurs not-
withstanding the fact that the defendant's negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident.
77 Summers v. Burdick, 191 Cal. App. 2d 464, 13 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1961).
78 275 A.C.A. at 1109, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
7o Green v. Smith, 261 Cal. App. 2d 392, 67 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1968).
80 W. PROSSER, LAW OP TORTS § 64 at 433 (3d ed. 1964).
81 Id.
82 Id.
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In other situations, plaintiff's negligence, although prior to that
of defendant's, may be found to have caused only a separable part
of the injury.8 Under such a situation, damages may be appor-
tioned if they are capable of logical division. However, cases will be
infrequent in which the extent of aggravation can be determined
with any reasonable degree of certainty, and the court may properly
refuse to divide the damages upon the basis of mere speculation. 4
Therefore, when the issue as to causation is speculative, a court
would be compelled to reject the doctrine of damage apportionment.
Also, such a doctrine would be in direct contradiction with the
current public policy toward expansion of liability and limitation
of defenses.8" It would cause the injured plaintiff to bear the finan-
cial burden of the injuries caused by defendant's negligence. Cal-
ifornia's public policy has been toward an increased concern for
providing compensation to the plaintiff who is injured in an auto-
mobile accident. 86
If the seat belt defense is to be accepted, conceivably issues
under the doctrine of last clear chance may also be involved. 7 For
example, in the typical guest-driver case the Truman rationale would
allow the defendant driver to raise contributory negligence as a de-
fense. However, if the driver were aware of the plaintiff's failure to
buckle up, he might have averted plaintiff's injuries. Under these
circumstances the guest could apply the doctrine of last clear chance.
CONCLUSION
Seat belts are just the beginning. New and more effective safety
devices are now available and will soon become standard equipment
in all new vehicles. Shoulder harness installation is already re-
quired by federal statute. 8 However, medical opinion as to the
efficacy of shoulder harnesses is even more divided than with seat
belts.8 9 If the logic of the Truman decision is accepted, there will
probably be an effort made to establish a shoulder harness defense.
Does the decision of the Truman court mean that with every new
safety device that is offered, a motorist may be held contributorily
negligent for failure to make use of such equipment? Possibly the
Truman decision would apply only when installation is required by
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See Hayton, Present and Prospective Changes in California Automobile Neg-
ligence Law, 2 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 201 (1969).
86 Id.
87 Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 1428, 1431 (1967).
88 32 Fed. Reg. 2415, Standard No. 208, § 3.1.1 (1967).
89 See Beloud, The Changing Seat Belt Laws, 4 TlaAL, Je-Jl, 1968, at 56.
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statute. Consideration, however, should be given to whether or not a
negligent defendant was intended to be protected by statutes requir-
ing the use of seat belts or other safety devices.
A further result of the Truman decision could be an expanded
and more costly trial. A very real problem would be presented in
cases where only small claims are involved. The cost of obtaining
expert witnesses may prove to be prohibitive. A policy that places
such a financial burden on the parties would seem to produce an
undesirable result.
The end result of the Truman decision is the establishment of
an inequitable standard of conduct-one that would subject motor-
ists with seat belts installed to a higher standard of care than
motorists not possessing seat belts.
Larry R. Feiner
